Forward look – Ukraine – 1

A destroyed Russian column in Bucha (Wikimedia)

November 2024

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What began as a Russian invasion of Ukraine, a show of force aimed at decapitation of the state, the destruction of democracy, and the installation of a puppet administration didn’t work out well for Russia.

There are many sources of news, interviews, and comment covering events in Russia and Ukraine. There’s a list of some of these at the end of the article. The history of events so far is also well covered. But here I want to consider the future. What might happen next?

In some ways, predicting the future is a fool’s errand, we will always fail in the detail. But where there are clear trends we can make educated guesses, and these can inform our actions in the here and now. Looking ahead is hugely useful. Do I need to buy more bread? How long will the milk remain usable? How can I raise the money to start a new business? Where shall I go on holiday next year? How should we change our behaviour to reduce the impact of global warming? Even walking along a footpath involves thinking about the next step, avoiding obstacles. Whether we’re planning our next footfall, considering our next holiday or our next career step – trying to predict the future is essential. And remembering the past is part of the process as we ask ourselves, ‘Have we seen a situation like this before? What happened last time?’

So what is likely to happen next in the war between Russia and Ukraine?

Russian advances on the front line

The pattern of previous months has continued, Russia has pushed forward, little by little, day by day, sometimes in just one part of the front line, sometimes in several. But these advances have been mostly small, often just tens or hundreds of metres, sometimes a couple of kilometres. Looking at a large scale map it’s difficult to see any change at all, and sometimes Ukraine has pushed back. The bigger story, perhaps, is the cost to Russia in terms of men and materiel. They are losing around 40 000 men a month, along with large numbers of vehicles including tanks and armoured personnel carriers. Giving up ground slowly gives Ukraine many opportunites to destroy Russian troops and equipment.

The wet, muddy season that bogs down military vehicles has not yet fully materialised. Surely it will come soon. We may see a sharp drop in large scale movements by both sides; but there are other factors too. Russian losses in men and materiel have been savage, Ukrainian drone strikes have destroyed large amounts of stored ammunition and equipment, army HQ facilities, fuel supplies, airfields, and military industrial facilities. All of this is slowing Russian forces down and making everything more difficult.

It seems likely that Russia’s creeping advance will stall, and perhaps even go into reverse. There are already some signs that this is already happening, both in Kursk and along the frontlines in Ukraine. Expect this trend to continue.

Presence of Korean forces

The evidence so far is that Korean troops are not likely to make much difference. They have not been very effective so far in Kursk where they’ve been deployed. At best, they may delay Russia’s need to find additional Russian troops.

Donald Trump as US President Elect

This is a difficult one to call. Trump tends to be erratic and therefore unpredictable. Perhaps the best we can do is wait and see. Ukraine will hope for the best but prepare for the worst.

Technology

The Ukrainians have been very effective in developing novel solutions to seemingly intractable military problems; consider the sea drones, FPV warfare on the front lines, the development and use of very long range weapons to perform deep strikes on Russian facilities, the development of a cruise missile, even rumours of nuclear capability within a few months.

The trends here are suggestive. Russia has been innovative too, but on a much smaller scale. Certainly they have also made advances with FPV warfare and with electronic countermeasures, but to a greater extent than Ukraine they have depended on drawing down stocks of older and older equipment.

Russia seems to be slowly becoming less effective, Ukraine is rather quickly becoming more effective. Draw your own conclusions assuming this trend continues.

Power and energy supplies

Both nations have destroyed energy facilities. Russia has destroyed almost all Ukraine’s thermal power stations, and a large amount of hydro-electric power as well. Ukrainians will face a hard winter with insufficient electricity supply, depending now on nuclear plants and imports from the European grid.

Ukraine has seriously damaged Russian oil facilities, taking out many refineries and storage depots. It’s also likely that Russian oil pipelines will freeze this winter, and getting them back online will be very difficult and expensive to say the least. Even without Ukrainian strikes, Russian infrastructure of all kinds is in a poor state because of inadequate maintenance, and there were some notable failures last winter.

Russian economy

Sanctions have profoundly hurt Russia’s economy. Oil and gas revenues have been very hard hit, many skilled and unskilled industrial staff have died in the war leaving severe manpower shortages, the Rouble has fallen in value, inflation and high interest rates are making themselves felt. The future doesn’t look promising.

Unhappy and rebellious populace

It’s quite clear that the Russian people are becoming unhappy. By contrast, in Ukraine people are weary but morale remains high.

Russia can flip when the people are deeply unhappy; there have been similar situations before. In 1917 the autocratic leadership of the Czar brought both defeat in war and hunger to the population – there was a revolution. In 1991, the fall of the Soviet Union followed defeat in Afghanistan and restlessness at home. And in 2024 we see similar conditions building right now – the Russian Army may fail in Ukraine and there’s growing unrest as living conditions worsen and so many families have lost fathers, husbands, brothers and sons in Putin’s war.

We can only conclude that something similar may happen again. It’s not guaranteed, but nor is it impossible.

I might revisit this topic in future if I sense there are useful new points to be made.

See also:

• Jake Broe
• Kyiv Independent, The
• Kyiv Post
• Silicon Curtain
• Times Radio

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